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The recent decade has witnessed a strong expansion of work on the firm, both from a capabilities
perspective and from a contractual perspective. These two bodies of theories are often thought to be
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pursue a research strategy on this basis. However, it is also possible two claim that they are rivals.
Along this line, it is argued that the capabilities perspective contains propositions about economic
organization that are not to be found within the modern Coasian approach to economic organization,
and thus may be seen as a distinct emerging perspective on economic organization.
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I. Introduction
After decades of relative neglect, the theory of the firm has now become one of the most rapidly
expanding research areas in economics, winning one of its pioneers, Ronald Coase (1937), the Nobel
prize . Much of the frontier research in modern economics is conducted within areas that lie close to1
or directly within the domain of the theory of the firm, and new mathematical techniques and concepts
(e.g., super-modularities, lattice theory) are brought to bear on organizational issues. 
The general economic expansion of interest in the firm and in economic organization in
general is reflected in a broad menu of contemporary theories of economic organization. Thus, we
have Oliver Williamson's (1985) brand of transaction cost economics, nexus of contracts theories
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Cheung, 1983), the more recent outgrowth of these theories, namely
agency theory (Holmström, 1982), and the incomplete contract approach pioneered by Grossman and
Hart (1986). 
Although these contractual theories of the firm differ -- sometimes rather substantially --
they are all agreed on emphasizing the importance of property rights, asymmetric information, and
some behavioral assumption that extends the usual self-interest assumption (such as 'opportunism' or
'moral hazard'). In lieu of such notions, it is not possible to tell much of a story of why there should be
firms in a market economy. In fact, the combined notions of property rights (and therefore incentives),
asymmetric information and extended self-interest are necessary for telling this story. 
An excellent summing-up of modern contractual economics is provided by Paul Milgrom
and John Roberts' recent textbook on Economics, Organization, and Management    (1992).
 However, the title and the content of that book also indicates some problematic features with the
new contractual economics: there is many excellent pages on economics and on its application to
organizational issues -- but there is actually very little on management proper, not to speak of
strategy. The management issue becomes almost completely reduced to providing the right incentives;
but surely there is more to management and strategy than this.
In fact, within management studies much has happened with respect to the firm during the
last one and half decade. Scholars are increasingly turning away from the pure industry analysis
framework associated with Michael Porter (1980). Whereas in the industry analysis framework, the
firm is treated as essentially a black box, strategy researchers are now turning towards an approach
that places primary emphasis on the firm's endowment of capabilities for understanding the sources
of sustained competitive advantages. Capabilities constitute the knowledge base of the firm, and as
such belong to the firm level rather than to level of the individual agents. They are normally seen as
productive bundles of routines of a highly tacit and social nature, and they are operated by teams of
5The most important precursors of this new perspective are probably Penrose (1959), Richardson (1972), Demsetz2
(1973) and Nelson and Winter (1982). Richardson (1972) coined the ‘capabilities’ terminology.
Foss (1994c) provides an accompanying, but much more methodologically oriented, discussion of ‘Why Transaction3
Cost Economics Needs Evolutionary Economics’. 
individuals (primarily the management team, cf. Penrose, 1959) for some strategic purpose (see
Metcalfe & De Liso, 1995). 
Firms are seen in this perspective as essentially heterogenous -- and as creating this hetero-
geneity endogenously (Nelson, 1991). Competitive advantage is accounted for in terms of efficiency
differences yielding rents, and sustainability of these advantages are rationalized by pointing to
competitors' difficulties of imitation (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986a; Winter, 1987; Dierickx &
Cool, 1989) . I here take the capabilities perspective to also include the evolutionary conceptualiza-2
tion of the firm presented in Nelson and Winter (1982), as well as the dynamic capabilities perspective
recently introduced by David Teece and his colleagues (Teece et al., 1995). 
The ensuing pages start out from the above relatively recent tendencies in the economic
analysis of the firm, that is to say, from capabilities and contractual theories of the firm. I discuss two
basic research strategies that has to do with the relations between these theories. The first is the
complementarity interpretation, as it is found in recent attempts to bring capabilities and contractual
theories together . In this interpretation, there is a tendency to minimize the differences between the3
capabilities perspective and contractual theories, and instead stress that propositions from both
theories may be usefully combined.  
I further argue that although it is in fact possible to bring capabilities perspectives and
contractual approaches together -- that this is a viable research strategy -- the capabilities perspective
implies propositions on economic organization that are not captured by the contractual approach in its
present form. Moreover, the perspective does not -- in contrast to contractual theories -- rely on
notions of morally hazardous behavior. Consequently, one may see the capabilities perspective as an
emerging distinct perspective on economic organization. This is essentially an interpretation that
stresses the rivalrous relation between the two sets of theories. It may be defended, for example, by
pointing to the very deep underlying differences in terms of which kind of economics the two theories
are derived from (evolutionary vs neoclassical economics) or simply by claiming more empirical
relevance for the issues investigated in the capabilities perspective relative to the issues investigated in
the contractual perspective. 
Because these interpretations are likely to influence future work on economic organization,
there is a need for clarifying them. This essay represents the beginning of such a clarification. I begin
with a basic proposition; one may seem trivial at first: economic organization is extremely sensitive to
the assumptions that are made with respect to knowledge. The seeming triviality stems, of course,
from the circumstance that it is part of all theories of economic organization that whether knowledge
is symmetrically or asymmetrically distributed, whether the future is uncertain or not, etc. make a
6However, I shall only be concerned with the issue of the boundaries of the firm and neglect internal organization and4
existence issues. 
crucial difference. For example, it is not possible to discriminate among different kinds of economic
organization on grounds of efficiency under full information and no uncertainty; one kind of economic
organization is as good (efficient) as any other kind. However, these standard insights are not what
really what I am driving at.
Inspired by the capabilities perspective, I shall rather argue that other conceptualizations of
knowledge are crucially important and not completely covered by the standard asymmetric informa-
tion paradigm. Starting from production, rather than from exchange (cf. Richardson, 1972; Loasby,
1994), makes this much clearer. Specifically, the tacit and social components of knowledge as
embodied in capabilities matter crucially to economic organization. It is central to the argument that
these two dimensions are center stage in capabilities theories of the firm, while they are -- on the
whole -- neglected in contractual theories. In short, the overall character of the argument is that for
understanding economic organization , we should pay more attention to the issue of the distribution4
of production knowledge between firms (Demsetz, 1988) -- and in particular to the character of this
knowledge. 
II. Some Empirical Anomalies
In this section, I argue by means of two examples that there is a need for more fully integrating
knowledge considerations with considerations of economic organization, such as the issue of the
boundaries of the firm. Specifically, existing theory does not allow us to fully understand the modern
corporation in its complex entirety, nor does it allow us to understand the more topical theme of
outsourcing. 
II.i. Alfred Chandler on the Modern Corporation
Consider Alfred Chandler's (1977, 1990a, 1992) description of the evolution and character of the
modern corporation. A key theme here is that the 'visible hand' of the hierarchy differs in essential
aspects from the invisible hand of the market in terms of mode of resource allocation (quantities vs
prices). In other words, key insights of organizational economics are present in Chandler's work.
However, this does emphatically not mean that all of his insights can be reduced to standard organiza-
tional economics; in fact, Chandler has grown increasingly skeptical towards Williamson's (1985)
brand of organizational economics, which he once embraced. As Chandler's reflections on the matter
confirm, this is essentially because the corporation is not only a contractual entity -- it is just as much
a part of its 'essence' that it is a learning and innovating entity that seeks competitive advantage from
7And see Lazonick (1991) for an even more radical view that proceeds in terms of a complete dichotomization between5
market and hierarchy. Lazonick in particular, but also to some extent Chandler, may be criticized for having a much too
stylized view of "the market", one that neglects both the empirical reality of all sorts of long-lived cooperative relations
between firms and the theoretical message of such seminal contributions as Richardson (1972). 
But see Langlois and Robertson (1995) for an ambitious attempt to construct a general theory of the impact of economic6
change on economic organization, designed for addressing and answering such questions.
scale and scope advantages based on superior capabilities. In fact, as Chandler (1992) now tells the
story, the firm exists because it is a hotbed for the cultivation of innovative capabilities. Such capabili-
ties do not square easily with market relations. 
This would seem to imply a ringing endorsement of the merits of vertical integration. And,
indeed, according to Chandler (1990b), being big and heavily vertically integrated is one condition for
successful performance, at least on the global arena; this best makes it possible to stimulate efficient
throughput, innovation and development of capabilities . Arguably, vertical integration is currently out5
of fashion, and at any rate, Chandler's views are flatly contradicted by those who advocate 'the virtual
corporation', to wit, the relatively short-lived but extremely flexible partnering that develops in order
to reap temporary technological opportunities, as the organizational form of the future, by the
advocates of 'networking', 'industrial districts', etc. 
On whose side should we place out bets? The problem is that our existing theoretical
apparatus does not really allow us to say much meaningful about when and under which circumstan-
ces Chandler-type firm organization dominates 'the virtual corporation' (and similar de-centralized
types of organization) and vice versa . We could, of course, examine and compare the transaction6
properties of each kind of organization at a given point of time. However, this would lead us to
neglect the more dynamic aspects: an organization that is burdened by heavy transaction costs -- for
example, because of a strong internal variety of behaviors which result in agency problems -- may
nevertheless display superior survival capability, because its variety of behaviors allow it to engage in
learning that lead to dynamic efficiency. Alternatively, we could focus on only dynamic efficiencies
and forget about static efficiencies. Or, one could deem neither alternative attractive, and call for
some integrated framework that has room for both sides of the story, that is to say, features both
propositions about knowledge-accumulation and propositions about more static transaction cost
issues.
II.ii. The Perils of Excessive Outsourcing
Another -- but closely related -- example has to do with the current debate on outsourcing (as
summarized in Bettis, Bradley and Hamel, 1992). Outsourcing simply means letting suppliers take
over activities that were once undertaken in-house; thus, it is an instance of vertical disintegration.
Because it allows the firm to get access to the high-powered incentives of market supply (rather than
8Again, Milgrom and Roberts' (1992) textbook provides evidence here: the book essentially relies on the Arrow-Debreu7
framework in developing insights in economic organization.
internal procurement) and because it allows the firm to eliminate some fixed costs, outsourcing may
be an attractive strategy, particularly for lagging business units. 
However, unless it is carefully executed, this strategy will from a Chandlerian perspective be
associated with serious perils. In fact, the critics of outsourcing have (unknowingly) taken a Chand-
lerian position and have argued that excessive outsourcing on the part of Western firms to Japanese
and South-East Asian firms has led to a loss of ability to upgrade capabilities on the part of Western
firms in many industries. Thus, the pursuit of static efficiency has harmed dynamic efficiency. This is
so, because Western firms have not understood the strategic intentions of their Asian suppliers
(namely to learn from the relation rather than to simply supply) who have later emerged as vigorous
competitors, have allowed Asian supplier firms to get 'too close' to core capabilities, have lost track of
important technological developments in components and the manufacture of components, etc. 
How should we theoretically approach this story? Notice that the outsourcing story essenti-
ally says that the problems are caused by 1) overly myopic strategic beliefs (which lead to a focus on
short-term cost-cutting by means of outsourcing), leading to 2) changes in the boundaries of the firm
(vertical disintegration), 3) retarding the learning capacity of the firm, and therefore 4) destroying the
firm's ability to upgrade its capabilities, harming its long run competitive advantage. In other words,
understanding the dynamics of outsourcing requires an understanding of the interplay between the
development of the knowledge assets of the firm and it boundaries.
Thus, the two above examples are only instances of the broader problem of understanding
how knowledge and the boundaries of the firm interact. This problem was first clearly articulated by
such post-Marshallian economists as Harold Malmgren (1961) and George Richardson (1972) (Foss,
1995), but was for long left unexamined by the modern heirs to Coase's contractual analysis. Howe-
ver, they have now increasingly realized that there may be a need to combine propositions from
capabilities and contractual theories. In the following section, I discuss some work along these lines.
III. Capabilities and Contractual Theories of the Firm
III.i. Towards an Integration
As presented in the works of Williamson, Alchian and Demsetz, Grossman and Hart and others, the
contractual approach is probably best understood as an extension of the traditional microeconomic
theory of allocation and optimality . One consequence of this is that its primary object of explanation7
is the efficient organization of existing economic resources. It is outside the prerogative of standard
contractual analysis to examine how new resource uses are discovered, how resources are accumula-
9Some representatives are Teece (1982, 1987b, 1990), Klein (1988), Kreps (1990), Reve (1990), and Dosi, Winter and8
Teece (1992).
ted, how firms learn, which governance structures best promote learning under which circumstances,
etc. The economic problem has to do with combining inputs and outputs in a transaction cost
minimizing way, given technology, inputs and outputs. Issues such as the dynamics of outsourcing or
the evolution of the modern corporation cannot be approached in their complex entirety. 
It is probably as a result of a recognition of such current limitations that David Teece
identifies the following desideratum:
'[i]n order to fully develop its capabilities, transaction cost economics must be
joined with a theory of knowledge and production' (Teece, 1990: 59). 
Clearly, Professor Teece is the right person to issue such a verdict: his own work demonstrates that
issues such as diversification (Teece, 1982) and the innovation boundaries of the firm (Teece, 1987b)
are best approached in terms of a theory that combines capability and contractual theories. It will do
for understanding such phenomena to conceptualize the firm as simply a nexus of contracts among
input owners. 
Teece's position has recently been echoed by Oliver Williamson. The earlier versions of what
may be called Williamson's 'efficiency hypothesis' asserted that transactions are aligned with those
types of economic organization that minimize the costs of organizing those transactions. However,
now the efficiency-hypothesis goes the following way: 
'Align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures,
which differ in their costs and competences in a discriminating (mainly, transaction
cost economizing) way' (Williamson, 1991a: 79; my emphasis).
In other words, Teece, and now also Williamson, recognize the need for supplementing the
notion of the firm as a contractual entity with a notion of the firm as a bundle of capabilities. What is,
however, open to discussion is the actual mechanisms that their conceptualizations conceal or
sidestep. How should it be done? How precisely do capabilities influence transaction costs, and
therefore the boundaries of the firm? In the following sections, I identify some possible mechanisms.
III.ii. Possible Points of Contact
As already indicated, a small, but growing, literature has addressed the relation between firms'
capabilities and their boundaries . The majority of these studies implicitly or explicitly accept the8
proposition that efficient economic organization is above all a matter of somehow aligning the
10
However, as far as I know, no formal models have been developed of the connection. 9
Rabin (1993) and Brynjolfsson (1994) extend the basic Grossman and Hart analysis to knowledge assets. 10
incentives that cooperating input-owners face. Nevertheless, it is still possible in principle to add
capabilities considerations to basic incentive ideas and vice versa. For example, one may argue that
the full realization of the rent-yielding potential of capabilities requires incentives that harmonize the
actions of resource-owners, and provide stimuli to investment in the accumulation of human capital.
Thus, contractual theories may help us better understand the organization and accumulation of
capabilities (cf. Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). This is a clear complementarity between the two theories.
But the complementarity is potentially double-sided -- for the notion of the firm as a bundle of
capabilities may influence propositions from contractual theories of economic organization, too.
Consider the following points.
A) Connecting to agency problems of internal organization. The notion of capabilities
connects to contractual theories of the agency variety . This is because the presence of capabilities in9
firms may influence the outcomes of principal-agent-type problems. Firms will often be characterized
by a distinct 'way of doing things' that is shared among input-owners. Such shared (common) know-
ledge may significantly reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems, simply by making
asymmetric information problems less severe, and therefore reduce overall agency costs. This is a
possible interpretation of why corporate cultures may be valuable assets to firms. 
B) Connecting to incomplete contract logic. According to incomplete contract theorists, a
certain pattern of asset ownership is the hallmark of the firm. Specifically, owners/managers possess
residual decision rights to the firm's physical assets (Grossman & Hart, 1986) . However, the theory10
does not say anything directly about how owners/managers exercise those rights. For example, they
may opportunistically hold-up employees, appropriating part of their share of the overall rents. In
other words, a latent prisoners dilemma-game exists between the two parties. Utilizing the theory of
the iterated prisoners' dilemma-game, Kreps (1990) argues that repeating such games may produce
supergames -- norm equilibria  -- that may be interpreted as organizational cultures, that is, as an
organizational dimension of capabilities. Because many outcomes are theoretically possible, the
observed heterogeneity of firm cultures is partly accounted for. Since cultures may have strong
productivity implications and may be largely inimitable, they may possess rent-earning potential
(Barney, 1986b).
C) Broadening the concept of Williamsonian asset specificity. A broader notion of William-
son's concept of asset-specificity is suggested by capabilities theories (Klein, 1988; Winter, 1988;
Reve, 1990). Williamson (1985: 55) mentions four types of asset specificity, namely human capital
11
Winter (1988: 178-179) further adds: "Evolutionary economics suggests that the concept of human asset specificity is11
central to understanding the functioning of the firm as a repository of knowledge. For understanding to progress,
however, the idea of "specificity" must be refined and linked to the broader context in which quasi-rents to various sorts
of productive knowledge are determined". 
specificity, site specificity, physical specificity, and specificity in terms of dedicated assets. These do
not incorporate capabilities; however, capabilities may be added to the list, and carry the same
implications for economic organization. As Torger Reve (1990: 137) formulates it: 'Core skills are of
high asset specificity and can only be governed internally' . Since capabilities may not only yield high11
Ricardian (efficiency) rents, but also high Paretian (quasi-)rents, standard reasoning dictates that they
be governed internally.
D) Allowing more realistic analysis of the scope of the firm. Casual empiricism confirms
that almost no firm has integrated the entire value-chain, the common explanation being that the firm
confronts increasing diseconomies of scope as it integrates activities that demand capabilities that are
increasingly dissimilar relative to the firm's own capabilities (Richardson, 1972). A similar explanation
applies to the explanation of diversification. This is a production oriented explanation, that may,
however, be given an interpretation in terms of incentives: as the firm moves increasingly away from
its core business, it confronts increasing adverse selection and moral hazard problems, since manage-
ment becomes increasingly unable to efficiently monitor employees or evaluate their human capital.
Agency costs rise correspondingly, producing the net profitability disadvantage associated with
further integration. 
E) Connecting to appropriability and innovation issues. Teece (1982, 1987b, 1990), among
others, has argued that there is a direct connection between the degree of appropriability a firm
confronts and its efficient (innovation) boundaries. For example, to the extent that the firm produces
valuable knowledge that is ill-protected by intellectual property rights, this may underlie expansions of
vertical as well as horizontal scope. However, if the firm on the other hand develop knowledge that is
hard to imitate, it may choose its boundaries much more narrowly. Generally, the more complex
and/or tacit the firm's knowledge base is, the fewer activities it has to integrate in order to 'isolate'
(Rumelt, 1984) rents. 
As can be inferred from an inspection of points A) to E), adding a notion of the firm as a
bundle of capabilities to the standard contractual theories does not change their fundamental logic; it
constrains the set of possible outcomes, but does not change the basic explanatory mechanisms. Thus,
on this reading, economic organization is first and foremost a matter of property rights and incentives.
With respect to economic organization, capabilities and cognition are secondary; incentive considera-
tions are primary, 'exchange' dominates 'production'. The following sections try to resurrect the
balance somewhat. By doing so, I now leave what was called the 'complementarity interpretation':
12
When I talk about 'standard contractual approaches' here and in the following, I except those contributions, such as Teece12
(1982, 1987b), that are well aware of the need to integrate production and contractual considerations. 
instead of stressing complementarities between the two theories, I now lean more towards the
interpretation that stresses their different and perhaps even rivalrous nature.
IV. Firms, Knowledge, and Production
I plan to argue that capabilities theories implicitly have things to say about economic organization that
are different from the standard contractual approaches . Preliminaries to this argument is the argu-12
ments that 1) how knowledge is conceptualized is extremely important to the theory of economic
organization; 2) the incentive-based contractual approaches incorporate an impoverished conception
of knowledge; and 3) there are determinants of economic organization that differ from those usually
considered in the standard approach. Specifically, superadditive interdependencies (i.e., economic
complementarities) among activities are highlighted by capabilities theories, but neglected in contrac-
tual theories. However, these interdependencies strongly influence economic organization. To see
this, let us begin where earlier writers (e.g., Richardson, 1972) advice us to begin our understanding
of economic organization, namely with the theory of production.
IV.i. The Theory of Production
The standard microeconomic theory of production and its uses have often been up for attack.
Assuredly, the standard theory is not fallacious per se or misplaced for all purposes. The argument of
the critics is rather that for some purposes, it is likely to seriously mislead. Such purposes include the
theory of economic organization. For example, Williamson (1985) points out that the standard theory
of production has been misused to arrive at a 'production function approach' to the firm, according to
which the firm is simply an efficient input-combiner. Evolutionary economists, such as Nelson and
Winter (1982) have phrased their critique somewhat differently: what they criticize is the atemporal
character of the standard theory. This implies a neglect of the sequentiality of productive operations
and the role of tacit accumulated knowledge in production. 
We may add that the framework is couched in equilibrium terms which taken together with
the neglect of tacit knowledge implicitly means that all profitable technological knowledge is shared
among firms. This means that in the standard setting, what one firm can do, another firm can in
principle do equally well (Demsetz, 1988) -- a complete denial a fundamental idea of economics: the
division of labor. This absurdity comes about because knowledge transfer is assumed costless and
superior knowledge will not remain unexploited by competitors. Finally, the assumption of instantane-
ous factor-combination obscures the fact that production takes place through a process of explicit and
13
implicit contract drafting, execution, monitoring, socialization, etc. among agents, that knowledge has
to communicated, actions coordinated, etc. 
All these unfortunate characteristics of the standard theory of production may have led to
the abandonment of a theory of production within contractual theories of the firm. However, nothing
has been constructed to replace the standard theory. Thus, paradoxically the conceptualization of
production in the standard theory  seems somehow to have been carried over to the contractual
approach (Demsetz, 1988): one often gets the impression that what has been added to the standard
microeconomic theory of production is merely an analysis of which incentives will bring the firm
closest to its production possibility frontier. Specifically, I argue that the continued, but implicit,
dominance of the framework has led scholars within the theory of economic organization to 
• largely neglect the role of tacit knowledge, implying that it becomes more legiti-
mate to assume that all knowledge for production purposes is shared among firms;
• neglect the social aspect of much productive knowledge (with the same implication as
above);
• assume that production costs do not vary over firms for the 'same' productive
tasks -- that is, what one firm can do, another firm can do equally efficient;
• and, as a consequence of all this, not allow the boundaries issue to turn on dif-
ferences in firms' endowments of productive knowledge, that is, their capabilities.
I the following, I briefly expand on these assertions, and also try to look at which implications for
economic organization may follow from a perspective that explicitly breaks with the standard theory
of production. As I see it, the capabilities perspective effectively performs this break. 
IV.ii. Capabilities perspectives on Productive Activities
In spite of a honorable prehistory that goes back at least to Alfred Marshall (Loasby, 1994), the
capabilities perspective is perhaps most often with Nelson and Winter (1982). As they are at pains to
emphasize, productive activities are not best understood as a matter of applying commonly accessible
explicit knowledge ('blueprints') in the instantaneous and profit-maximizing combination of factors of
production. Rather, such activities involve processes of accumulation of partly tacit knowledge
through various largely incremental learning-processes (learning by doing, by using, and by sear-
ching). This tends to make the firm's course of development path-dependent. It is ultimately these
properties that make firms differ. As Penrose (1959: 74) notes, it is the heterogeneity of the flows and
stocks of knowledge within firms -- not their physical resources -- that gives each firm its unique
character. Essentially, this is because physical resources can normally be acquired and combined by, in
14
principle, anybody, whereas knowledge assets, such as routines and capabilities, are difficult to
transfer, sell, communicate, etc. 
IV.iii. The Social Character of Knowledge in Firms 
In addition to its being tacit, much productive knowledge is an emergent aspect of the interaction of
many agents. As such it often has an existence that is, in a sense, independent of individual agents.
Thus, BMW's capabilities in high-precision engineering will not be substantially influenced by one
engineer's exit from that organization. In other words, the relevant knowledge capital assets are firm-
specific rather than agent-specific. Thus, firms come equipped with more knowledge than is embodied
in the sum of individual agents' human capital, as it were. This is precisely what Nelson and Winter
(1982: 124) mean by 'routine'; as they define it, 'Routines are the skills of an organization'. Levitt and
March (1988: 320) further expand the concept by seeing it as 
'...the forms, rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies around
which organizations are constructed and through which they operate. It also
includes the structure of beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures, and
knowledge that buttress, elaborate and contradict the formal routines'.
It is the emphasis on the social nature and the large degree of tacitness of routines that
underlies a crucial point in the capabilities perspective: that it is difficult -- both empirically and
conceptually -- to fully separate technology, production and organization. As Nelson and Winter
(1982: 104) argue '...skills, organization and 'technology' are intimately intertwined in one functioning
routine and it is difficult to say exactly where one aspect ends and another begins'. Prahalad and
Hamel (1990) also see technology and organization as strongly intertwined and not fully separable.
Consider, for example, their (1990: 82) definition of 'core competence' as '...the collective learning in
the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams
of technologies'. 
As these definitions suggest, routines, core competencies, capabilities, or whatever we
decide to call these knowledge assets are characterized by strong interdependencies (complementariti-
es) among activities and the agents participating in activities. As Richardson (1972) phrased it,
'closely complementary activities' are involved. These interdependencies may yield superior efficienci-
es (because of various sub-additivities); as a result, the capabilities that embody them may be valuable,
rent-earning assets to firm (Winter, 1987; Reed & DeFilippi, 1988). Moreover, as I later argue, these
interdependencies are important for understanding economic organization in the context of a capabili-
ties perspective.
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IV.iv. The Neglect of Production in Contractual Theories
Harold Demsetz (1988: 148) recently argued that in the contractual approach 
'...in some respects, information remain full and free. Although information is
treated as being costly for management control purposes, it is implicitly assumed
to be free for production purposes. What one firm can produce, another can
produce equally well, so that the make-or-buy decision is not allowed to turn on
differences in production cost'.
However, Demsetz did not identify the underlying reasons why knowledge for production purposes is
normally treated in this way in contractual theories. Based on the above discussion, I submit that the
reason is that knowledge for production purposes is not here represented as fundamentally tacit and
social. But if such knowledge is individualized and codifiable, it is surely a reasonable approximation
to assume that it will 'remain full and free'. This is so, because codifiable knowledge is easily spread,
and particularly so when it is not something that is inherent in the interaction between agents, but can
transferred across the boundaries of the firm by a single agent.
To the extent that firms differ in contractual theories (at least in their more neoclassical
versions), this is a matter of different endowments and/or asymmetric information. Specifically, a firm
may come equipped with a better transaction technology than another firm. However, capabilities are
conceptually distinct from endowments or information partitions: unlike endowments they change
through learning and application to problem-solving, and because of their tacit component, capabiliti-
es do not necessarily increase as information becomes more perfect (Dosi & Marengo, 1993). 
I shall argue that beginning with a theory of production that emphasizes the tacit and social
aspects of productive activities may lead to insights in economic organization that differ from standard
contractual theories. It is fundamentally a similar recognition that explains why Alfred Chandler has
now grown much more skeptical towards contractual theories of economic organization than he was
previously. As he says, if
'...the firm is the unit of analysis, instead of the transaction, then the specific nature
of the firm's facilities and skills becomes the most significant factor in determining
what will be done in the firm and what by the market' (Chandler, 1992: 86; my
emphasis). 
Thus, according to Chandler, the standard contractual approach may not have captured all
determinants of the boundaries of the firm. This has also been argued by none other than Ronald
Coase (1990): 
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Peteraf (1993) provides an excellent review of the literature.13
'...while transaction cost considerations undoubtedly explain why firms come into
existence, once most production is carried out within firms and most transactions
are firm-firm transactions and not factor-factor transactions, the level of transac-
tion costs will be greatly reduced and the dominant factor determining the institu-
tional structure of production will in general no longer be transaction costs but the
relative costs of different firms in organizing particular activities' (p.90).
We may interpret Chandler and Coase to be in agreement in seeing firms' endowments of capabilities
as something that co-determine their boundaries. They are also agreed that this is not fully captured
within the standard contractual framework. I expand on their assertions in the following.
V. Toward a Capabilities Approach to Economic Organization
V.i. Differential Capabilities and the Boundaries of the Firm
One obvious implication of the capabilities perspective on productive activities is that production
costs are something extremely specific to individual firms (Langlois, 1992). This is because the
underlying capabilities are correspondingly specific. Two different firms simply will not have the same
costs of carrying out the 'same' productive operation (Richardson, 1972). This is what specialization
and the division of labor is all about. And at the root of the benefits of specialization is accumulation
of more-or-less tacit knowledge, not only in the form of individual skills (as in Adam Smith's pin
factory), but more importantly in the form of the firm-specific knowledge capital represented by
capabilities. The emphasis on heterogeneous firm capabilities has been used in the literature to
account for inter- and intra-industry dispersals of return (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982), and for theori-
zing the foundations of competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1995). But it also has implications for the
theory of economic organization.
The crucial concept of the capabilities perspective may well be that of heterogeneity. For
example, it is basically heterogeneity that gives rise to differential rents and therefore differential
competitive success. Many attempts to pin down the conditions that must obtain for capabilities to
yield long-lived rent have been put forward  . However, they are all in agreement that one important13
condition is (strict or limited) in-imitability of the capability in question, that is to say, imitation costs
are very large or even infinite.
Searching for the characteristics that make assets non-imitable, Reed and DeFilippi (1990)
identify tacitness, complexity, and specificity as the crucial characteristics underlying imitation costs.
Clearly, these are characteristics of capabilities -- in fact, capabilities are particularly likely to satisfy
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Something similar is suggested by Nelson and Winter (1982: 119): "The point emphasized by evolutionary theory is that14
a firm with an established routine possesses resources on which it can draw very helpfully in the difficult task of
attempting to apply that routine on a larger scale..The replication assumption in evolutionary models is intended to reflect
the advantages that favor the going concern attempting to do more of the same, as contrasted with the difficulties that it
would encounter in doing something else or that others would encounter in trying to copy its success" (my emphasis).
these conditions. For example, capabilities are not bound to individual input-owners but are tied to
the interaction of a number of input-owners and acquire some permanence over time. Moreover,
while tangible assets may be the sources of initial competitive advantages, it seems intuitively likely
that only non-tangible assets can be sources of long-lived (sustainable) advantage, since most tangible
assets can be bought on factor markets, reverse-engineered, etc.  
Tacitness, complexity and specificity are also the reasons why capabilities will typically be
difficult to trade. A reason for this is that because of their very idiosyncracy, the market cannot easily
evaluate their worth on the basis of an observable and verifiable marginal product (Foss, 1993).
Rather than being traded, capabilities are accumulated internally (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). It is also
the difficulties of trading capabilities that explains why capabilities may determine the boundaries of
the firm. Thus, there is a nice parallel here between the conditions for competitive advantage and the
reasons why capabilities determine the boundaries of the firm. Specifically, the social, tacit, and
complex aspects are also important for understanding the boundaries of the firm. For example,
tacitness make capabilities hard to imitate, and therefore a potential source of competitive advantage;
but tacitness also gives rise to information costs, hence influences the boundaries of the firm . 14
That capabilities influence the boundaries of the firm was clearly glimpsed by the perhaps
most important precursor of the capabilities perspective, Edith Penrose, when she observed that 
'...integration may appear profitable because the firm believes it can produce some
of its requirements...much more cheaply than it can obtain them in the market'
(1959: 148).
Thus, according to Penrose, an activity may be internalized because the cost of production may be
lower than the prices emerging from market exchange -- quite apart from any incentive considera-
tions. The firm internalizes an activity because it can carry out production in a more production cost
efficient manner. This cannot take place within the settings described by contractual theories, since the
make or buy decision is not allowed to turn on considerations of capabilities.
However, differential capabilities, and therefore production costs, are empirically significant
variables for explaining the boundaries of the firm. In Walker and Weber's (1984) empirical study of
the make and buy decision, the most explanatorily important variable was the indicator for differential
firm capabilities, that is, production costs. And in the Monteverde and Teece (1982) study that aimed
to support the standard contractual approach, the most significant variable was the dummy for the
firm, representing the heterogenous and unobserved firm effects (Kogut and Zander, 1992: 394). To
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This is contrary to the thrust of, for example, the incomplete contract-approach of Grossman and Hart (1986). Here it is15
maintained that communication channels are chosen endogenously, so that information cost considerations cannot
determine governance structures. Only incentive considerations do so. The Grossman and Hart-argument seems,
however, to presuppose a high degree of flexibility of communication channels, when it may in reality take very long to
build them up. Underlying this may be the fact that Grossman and Hart (like Williamson) fundamentally abstract from the
"social capital" embodied in capabilities. Only (inalienable) human capital is considered. 
these quantitative statistical studies, we may add Chandler's (1990a, 1992) detailed qualitative studies
which basically amount to the same thing: that it is '...the specific nature of the firm's facilities and
skills' that most significantly determines '...what will be done in the firm and what by the market'
(Chandler, 1992: 86), rather than the incentive costs of internal governance relative to the incentive
costs of market governance. 
V.ii. Production Costs and Communication Costs
Although the above explanation because of its basis in a capabilities view of the firm tends to direct
our attention to production cost for explaining the boundaries of the firm, on a somewhat different
level communication cost considerations enter the story. Metaphorically, one may say that the firm
knows more than its contracts can tell (Kogut & Zander, 1992): because of the specificity and
tacitness of capabilities, not all of that the firm knows can be communicated to other firms. For
example, firms may confront difficulties communicating with suppliers who do not understand (at a
desirable level of communication costs) specifications of components; as a result, the firm may decide
to undertake production itself. 
This communication cost interpretation is, however, simply one side of the coin, the
capabilities/production cost interpretation being the reverse. They are both made of the same stuff,
namely the emphasis on the firm as a repository of capabilities that cannot easily or efficiently be
transferred over the boundaries of the firm. Note that this story has nothing to do with incentive
considerations. Rather, it appeals to a species of transaction costs that fundamentally touches on
issues of information and communication rather than on divergent interests (Langlois, 1992). 
What drives the story is basically the assumption that agents through working together,
learning the norms and cultures of firms, etc. become equipped with models of the world that differ
from those hold by other agents. This is something different from and deeper than the standard
asymmetric information assumption. The form of representation of the capability theory of the
boundaries of the firm is coordination games rather than prisoners' dilemma-games (Foss, 1993) ; it15
is a matter of getting agents to understand each other in the first place, rather than avoiding strategic
behavior by agents who have already a detailed understanding of each other. 
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VI. Concluding Comments
In this essay, I have discussed the relations among contractual and capabilities theories of the firm. A
distinction was introduced between a complementarity interpretation, according to which there was
no fundamental conflict between the two bodies of theories, and a interpretation that stressed rivalry
and according to which the capabilities perspective was a distinct emerging perspective on economic
organization that differed in important ways from contractual perspectives. 
Attempts to integrate key ideas from the two bodies of theories, following the complemen-
tarity interpretation, were reviewed. In most of these attempts, the incorporation of capabilities in an
otherwise unchanged contractual set-up merely functions to constrain the set of possible outcomes
from settings with misaligned incentives. 
The other interpretation, stressing rivalry, led to a brief sketch of a distinct theory of the
boundaries of the firm derived from capability-based insights in productive activities. This alternative
interpretation allows the boundaries of the firm to turn on considerations of production costs, or,
equivalently, communication costs that are conceptually unrelated to problems of aligning incentives.
The overall conclusions that were arrived at are:
• The important rent-yielding assets among firms' total asset-endowments are those that are
social and tacit. These characteristics make them impossible or difficult to trade and imitate
-- and more so than other assets. Capabilities represent such assets.
• One firm may be able to carry out a productive task more efficiently than another firm, not
necessarily as a result of superior incentives, but because of superior learning, cognition, etc.
-- in sum, the advantages normally associated with specialization. This difference in terms of
efficiency may help to explain the boundaries of the firm, in the sense that a firm may
internalize an activity because it can carry it out in a more cost-efficient way.
• The other side of differential capabilities explaining the boundaries of the firm is communi-
cation costs. Because of the above-mentioned characteristics of a capability, it may be costly
to communicate to, for example, suppliers. In a sense, firms know more than their contracts
can tell. Thus, the tacit and social aspects of capabilities explain why they may yield a
competitive advantage and they are the factors that explain why capabilities influence the
boundaries of the firm.
Thus, it is possible to construct propositions about economic organization that do not
directly turn on considerations of morally hazardous behavior and incentive alignment. Instead,
economic organization is fundamentally a matter of economizing with knowledge costs (Demsetz,
1988). 
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I have tried to refrain from too explicitly taken a side on which interpretation is 'the right
one', although the reader may have sensed that my sympathies lies with the attempt to construct a
distinct capabilities theory of economic organization. However, it is certainly possible to argue
sensibly in favor of both interpretations. Therefore, my primary aim has been to clarify positions and
interpretations, so that a somewhat clearer roadmap for future research in economic organization may
emerge. 
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